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Abstract
Decentralisation invests the sub-central authorities of a country with autonomy in political and
economic power the exercise of which may widen interregional divergence and inequality.
This paper provides evidence demonstrating that in the case of Italy the central government’s
policies for rationalisation and containment of the growth of health care expenditure in
combination with decentralisation in the administration and provision of  health care have
resulted in interregional inequality, aggravating the existing regional divergence.
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THE REGIONAL IMPACT OF HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE: 
THE CASE OF ITALY 
1. Introduction
Recent advancements in democratisation by devolution and subsidiarity, which delegate some
of the central government’s allocating goals to local and regional authorities, often result in
inequality in the provisions of the welfare state. In principle, decentralisation aims at public
sector efficiency in the production and distribution of services, improved decision making
with the use of local information, greater accountability and improved responsiveness to local
needs and conditions.  However, decentralisation also ushers a split in the responsibilities of
the relevant actors in the field of policy, which enables them to attach more weight to their
preferences, perceptions, strategic options and degree of compliance with the general policies
of the central government. Therefore, decentralisation can also have negative repercussions on
equality by propagating interregional divergence in the volume and allocation of both
budgetary revenues and expenditures.
Decentralisation and local autonomy also leave their mark in the sector of health care
expenditures by both regional expansion and retrenchment. National Health Service (NHS) is
a system of the welfare state which aims at the same standard health care to the citizens of a
country, wherever they live. But this declared aim has led the public health care expenditure
of most developed countries (such as the members of the OECD) to a long period of
escalating growth and therefore to the adoption of policies for rationalisation and control. In
many countries, the policies for containment of health care spending are applied at the same
time as they are also moving ahead with their plans for devolution and decentralisation. As a2
result, significant differences in regional public spending on health care are occurring which
add another facet to the already existing regional inequality problem. Italy is an example of
such a country.
In Italy, the share of health care expenditure on national income has been increasing
steadily over time, from 3.9% in 1960 to 6.6% in 1978 - when its NHS was established- and
to 7.7% in 1990. Therefore, the central government has lately introduced reforms aiming at
control the growth of national health spending. But Italy’s NHS is also becoming intensely
decentralised, thus reflecting closer the political and administrative division of Italy into
twenty regions. But regional authorities do in general allocate the available resources
according to local needs and often interpret the central government’s directives for control of
their health care budgets in their own differential ways. As a result, profound interregional
differences in health care expenditure occur which may aggravate the already existing
inequalities between the Italian regions.  The objective of this study, therefore, is to examine
the determinants of health care expenditure, to identify their geographic pattern and to analyse
the significance of the emerging differences between Italy’s regions. These objectives will be
pursued by developing and estimating an econometric model using pooled regional time-
series cross-section data of the period 1980-1995. The rest of the paper is organised as
follows: Section 2 presents an overview of Italy’s NHS structure and its reforms, outlining the
diverse evolution of regional health expenditure. The methodology and the data used in the
quantitative analysis are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we estimate the model and
discuss the results. Policy issues and concluding remarks are outlined in Section 5.3
2. An Overview of the Italian National Health Care System and its Reforms
Italy’s NHS (the Servizio Sanitario Nazionale, SSN), was established in 1978 to provide
comprehensive health insurance coverage and standard health care to all citizens and legal
residents wherever they live. The NHS is partially financed by contributions from workers and
their employers, while the self-employed, farmers, elderly and retired people pay a health tax.
These contributions cover about 41 percent of the total health care costs, with an additional 26
percent contributed by regional, provincial and district taxes and the remaining 33 percent by
patient copayments and private health insurance. About 16 percent of the population has some
type of private health insurance, consisting of group policies provided to workers through
employers or purchased by the affluent to supplement public care. 
The NHS is structured at three levels. At the top level, the Ministry of Health is
responsible for national health planning, budgeting, general administration and health
standards. The Ministry allocates funds to 20 Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) according
to a procedure based on a complex formula involving population size, average age, mortality
rates and other regional characteristics, among which there are the historical spending levels.
These sums are disbursed by the RHA to 200 local health agencies (LHAs). This decentralised
structure of the NHS, combined with frequent deviations from the agreed regional allocation
of central government funds and the right of local authorities to decide the expenditure side of
their budgets, often results in significant deviations from the agreed allocation formula, 
which cause inequalities in the provision of health care expenditure among Italy’s 20 regions. 
Consequently, Italy’s NHS displays both notable accomplishments and serious shortcomings. 
The accomplishments include the provision of universal comprehensive health care with
access to a wide range of health services.  But this gain was achieved at the cost of4
overextending the NHS. As a result, the main shortcomings were in the inadequacy of funding
right from the beginning: HOFFMEYER and McCARTHY, 1995.  Moreover, superimposing
the NHS on a country still imbued with regional socioeconomic disparities has led to major
regional differences in the quality and efficiency of health care services provided across the
country, particularly in the south the high concentration of the poor is found: PIPERNO and
DI ORIO, 1990; DIRINDIN, 1996. 
These problems continued despite the fast growth of public spending on national
health care which peaked at 6.6 per cent of GDP in 1991.  This high share of spending on
national health at a time of  large public deficits (and, lately, the need for drastic reductions in
the public debt to comply with the Maastricht criteria for participation in the European
Monetary Union, EMU) precipitated  two major reforms which have sought to reverse the
trend by guaranteeing only a limited but interregionally equal state provided health care funds. 
However, the reduction of the centrally provided funds raised the weight of the other sources
of financing health expenditure in the regional budgets and provided the regional authorities
with more power in running their economic affairs. Thus, the divergence between the better
from the worst off regions in matters of social policy and welfare widened.  
Starting from 1992, a first set of reforms was specifically designed to increase the
autonomy of RHAs in both the financing and delivery of health care. The National Health
Fund continued to be allocated among regions on a capitation formula, with a lagged
compensation for in-patient transfers between regions.  But the share of the regional
contribution was gradually increased by expanding the financial autonomy of the regions in
matters of taxation. The RHAs also became directly responsible for planning health care
expenditure and will be increasingly free to manage their own funds. Since the Italian regions
are still characterised by deep economic disparities, increasing decentralisation could in5
principle widen the interregional divergence in both funding and spending on health care. 
These reforms were combined with several cost containment policies which have also been
undertaken at central level, such as wage freeze and budget cuts for drugs, employment and
equipment. As a result the rate of growth of public per capita health care expenditure was
reduced from about 2.0 per cent a year during 1980-91 to less than 0.5 per cent in 1992-95.
However, once again, the spending pattern of the regions remained highly diverse with
increased variation around the national average. 
Table 1 shows the evolution of per capita regional health care expenditure at 1990
prices. In 1980, the range of interregional differences in per capita health care expenditure was
78 (Emilia Romagna vs. Basilicata), the mean 655.4 and the standard deviation 119.9. In
1995, the range increased to 118 (Emilia Romagna vs. Puglia), the mean to 826.0 and the
standard deviation to 157.1. In the period 1980-1991, that is before the start of the NHS
reform process, the average expenditure increased by more than 22% but with significant 
interregional deviations, most notably between the Northern and Central regions and those of
the South which display a more heterogeneous pattern (e.g., Basilicata=50.42%,
Calabria=44.23% and Sicily=29.53% vs. Campania= 2.82%). Overall, before the reforms,
there were deep inequalities in the distribution of public health care expenditure among the
regions which, following historical patterns, favoured the richest regions of North and Centre.
The 1992 reforms attempted to contain the growth of national health care expenditure while
observing the declared objective of NHS to provide equality in health care in all citizens
whenever they happen to live. It is, therefore, worth exploring further whether the latest
reforms have guided the NHS towards the intended directions by checking the growth of
health spending and ameliorating the interregional  inequality in the provision of public health
care.6
3. Methodology and Estimation
The demand for health care would presumably depend on the conditions of an individual’s
health, medical costs and income. However, if public or private insurance meets the medical
costs, the patient does not pay these costs which are shifted to others.  If this is the case, a
person’s demand for health care is not limited by price, private budgetary considerations or
ability to pay: PAULY, 1986.  In countries providing centrally national health care, only
supply constraints would determine the size of public health care expenditure.  It is argued,
therefore, that for several economic and political reasons, such countries display relative
incapacity to deal with demand pressures
1.  Similar considerations would presumably apply to
the analysis of health care expenditure at the interregional level with the impact of
interregional differences added as an additional quest
2. 
We propose to identify the determinants of health expenditure among the Italian
regions using a large sample of pooled time-series and cross-section data.  Since Italy has a
national health service which includes the interregional equality of health care among its
objectives, it is reasonable to begin by assuming that our parameter estimates are constant
across regions
3. However, Italy suffers from deep regional economic divergence which may
have affected the regional patterns of health care expenditure. Moreover, the drastic reforms
of the last few years may have affected differentially the regions. Therefore, to take account of
these features of Italy’s NHS,  we follow a three-stage estimation procedure.  In the first stage,
we identify the factors that determine the volume of health care expenditure in an
industrialised country such as Italy.  In the second stage, we show that with respect to health
care expenditure the regions of Italy do not constitute a homogeneous group and introduce
region-specific dummy variables to account for the disclosed differences. Finally, in the third7
stage, we introduce regional, time-specific dummy variables to take account of each region’s
response to the policies for containment of the growth of national health expenditure. 
First stage: The health expenditure literature has suggested several socioeconomic,
demographic and lifestyle determinants of per capita health care expenditure: HITIRIS and
POSNETT, 1992.  However, in empirical research the choice of explanatory variables is often
constrained by the availability and quality of data
4. Following previous practice, we use a
parsimonious empirical model, in which real per capita public health care expenditure (H) is
regressed against: per capita real GDP (Y);  the ageing population (A); and structural
characteristics of the health care supply, such as: (i) the total number of beds per hospital 
(BH), as a measure of economies of scale: other things being equal, the more the beds per
hospital, the larger the hospital, the lower the expenditure; and (ii) the number of medical and
non medical personnel per hospital (SH), as a measure of productivity improvement: the more
the staff per hospital, the higher the expenditure, and vice versa
5. Therefore, our empirical
model takes the form:
                           Hnt  = b0+ b1 Ynt + b2 Ant + b3 HBnt + b4 HSnt  + ut                      (1)
where the subscript n stands for region and t for time and the estimated coefficients are
expected to have the following signs: b1 > 0,  b2 >0,  b3 <0, and b4 >0.
For the estimation, we pooled the t=16 time-series observations, 1980-95, of the n=20 regions
to form a sample of 320 observations, thus making use of both cross-section/long-run and
time-series/short-run information
6. 
The regional subdivision of a country is a specific non-random set and, therefore, the
estimation concerns a fixed effects model subject to stochastic disturbances. Consequently, we8
applied an estimation method that takes account of the openness and interdependence of the
regional economies within a country and corrects econometric problems arising from the
nature of the data in the sample by postulating that the pooled set of regional data is cross-
sectionally correlated and time-wise autoregressive: KMENTA, 1986.  Consistent estimates
are derived by subjecting the pooled observations to  ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation
to calculate the corresponding residuals. These are used to transform the variables, remove the
autocorrelation and by applying generalised least squares (GLS) obtain asymptotically
efficient estimates of the regression coefficients and their variances
7. 
An issue which must be examined before proceeding with the estimation is the
functional form of the suggested relationship.  Previous research in this field has invariably
shown preference for the log-linear rather than the linear functional form. There are two
reasons, however, why this is incorrect: (a) Many of the explanatory variables (in our case A,
HB and HS are expressed as percentages and it is therefore inappropriate to convert them into
logs; (b) Expenditure on health care is one of the components of total national expenditure
and thus it is subject to the ‘adding up’ constraint. This means that, if the functional form of
the health care expenditure is set as log-linear, then the functional form of rest of the
expenditure would necessarily be nonlinear so that the two add up to give the total
expenditure. Since there is no reason to assume that health expenditure is different from other
expenditures, it is incorrect to impose on it the log-linear functional form: ANDERTON et al.,
1992. Therefore, the functional form of the model is a priori linear but, to be on the safe side,
we subjected the data to the Box-Cox estimation to test whether the model is linear (=1) or
log-linear (=0). The test statistic for =0 provided 2[-346.581 + 343.230]= 6.702, while for
=1 provided 2[-346.581+ 345.922]=1.318, which for 
2(1)=3.841 confirm that the linear
model is accepted and the log-linear model is rejected
8.9
The estimation provided the equation 1 in Table 3 which displays high goodness-of-fit
statistics
9 and coefficients which are statistically significant and have the expected signs in
accordance with the a priori economic and statistical criteria.  However, the estimated
equation displays both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation: Harvey test=21.111 and Clejer
test=14.940, confirming heteroskedasticity at 
2(4)=9.4886; and DW=0.930, confirming
positive serial correlation. These problems could be caused by misspecification arising from
unaccounted interregional differences and, therefore, we proceeded to re-specification of the
model.
Second stage: To examine whether the regions in the sample constitute a homogeneous group
we introduced in equation (1) a set of dummy variables for each of the regions to test for
cross-section specific effects: JUDGE et al., 1988. Therefore, in our estimation we assume
that the slope coefficients of the explanatory variables remain constant while the intercept
term, which accounts for the fixed effects, is allowed to vary across regions in accordance
with regional heterogeneity. Consequently, the dependent variable is influenced by three types
of factors: (i) those we know about and explicitly specify in the equation (such as income, age
structure etc.); (ii) those for which no recorded information is available and their influence is
captured by the constant term, b0; (iii) those which are latent variables, not directly
quantifiable (such as political influences and lobbying activities), with influence recorded by
categorical or dummy variables. Therefore, in addition to the explanatory variables and the
constant term, our model includes a dummy variable for each region, REGi, where i = 1-19
regions (region 20 being the constant term), and the model is specified as:
      
                           Hnt  =  b0 + b1 Ynt + b2 Ant + b3 HBnt + b4 HSnt  + b5 REGi + ut            (2)10
where b5>0 or  b5<0 depending on whether a region allocates to health care more or less than
the average expenditure (when b5=0).  The preliminary estimation yielded strong evidence of
clustering of the 20 regions into seven distinct groups (REGi  AREAj, j= 0-6) classified
under three broad categories according to the pattern of their health expenditure, as shown in
Table 2. Therefore, in addition to the constant term, which represents the cluster of average
spending regions, AREA 0, we introduced six dummy variables (AREA 1-6) to represent the
regional clusters.  The results of the estimates are presented in Table 3, equation 2. Once
again, the estimates satisfy the standard economic and statistical criteria. The estimated
coefficients of the explanatory variables, including the AREA 1-6 clusters are statistically
significant and posses the expected sign. Estimation of equation (2) without the AREA
dummies provided SSE=219.5.  Consequently, the Chow test for the joint significance of the
AREA dummies yielded F=18.68 which, against tabulated F(19, 294)=1.65 at the 0.05 level,
confirms the statistical significance of the identified regional clusters
10.  These results show
that there are statistically significant differences among regional areas. For example, the
highest expenditure cluster (AREA4 = Friuli Venezia Giulia and Liguria) spends on health
twice as much as and the lowest one (AREA2 = Lombardia), that is [Constant + AREA4 =
0.519] : [Constant - AREA2 = 0.258] = 2.01. This is a quantitatively important finding. 
Overall, these results suggest that our specification of the health care expenditure
function is admissible and therefore the estimation results are reliable. The estimated income
elasticity confirms the predominance of GDP in the determination of health spending. The
point estimate of income elasticity at sample means is 0.33, well below the “luxury good”
designation. Figure 1 shows the association between health care expenditure, H, and its main
explanatory variable, GDP per head, and the differences between the identified regional
clusters. AREA 0 is spot average; AREAS 3, 4 and 5 are above average in both GDP and11
health spending; AREAS 1 and 2 are above average in GDP and below average in health
spending; and AREA 6 is below average in both GDP and health spending. 
Ageing, A, with elasticity 0.16, shows that an increase in dependancy would raise
health expenditure. This accords with our expectations and stylized facts and contrasts with
previous research
11 which has concluded that ageing “can only account directly for a tiny
fraction of the increase in expenditure” and that “on balance, neither the direct nor the indirect
effects of aging on expenditure appear to account for most of the sustained rise in medical
expenditure” (in the US: NEWHOUSE, 1992, p. 6). This has important implications for Italy
because of predicted rapid changes in the population structure.  In 1990, 14 per cent of the
Italian population were 65 years old or over. This is forecasted by the OECD to rise to 20 per
cent by 2020, increasing the pressures on Italy’s the health care expenditure to grow. The
estimated coefficients for the variables directly related to the supply of health care are also
significant. As expected, the beds per hospital, BH, has a negative coefficient and elasticity -
0.07 which could be interpreted as an indicator of economies of scale at regional level. The
supply of personnel per hospital, SH is also significant with elasticity 0.05, suggesting that in
this labour-intensive sector where labour cost accounts for the largest share of current costs,
further increases in the employment of labour have a positive impact on the growth of health
care expenditure.
Third stage:  In order to take into account the reform process of the health care system and to
assess how it has affected the regional health care expenditure, we re-estimated the model
after inserting for each region a time-dummy variable, RDi, (where i =1-19), for the years after
the start of the reforms, 1993-95:
           Hnt  = b0 + b1 Ynt + b2 Ant + b3 HBnt + b4 HSnt + b5 AREAi + b6 RDi, + ut         (3)12
This procedure assumes that the regions vary in their compliance with the central
governments reforms and thus delivered different end results. In other words, the time-series
of each region might have displayed a breaking point and discontinuity after the introduction
of the reforms, which we account for by introducing region-specific time-dummy variables.
The empirical model obtained, after eliminating the statistically non significant dummies, is in
Table 3, equation 3.  The significant regional time-dummy variables, RDi  (i=2, 3, 9, 13, 15,
16, 20), specify the regions which differ from the rest by expenditure patterns above or below
the average. Estimation of equation (3) with the AREA dummies only provided SSE=99.682,
while with the addition of the regional time-dummies for the reforms, RD, it provided
SSE=318.78. Consequently, the Chow test for the joint significance of the regional time-
dummy variables yielded F=6.78, which against tabulated F(19, 293)=1.62 at the 0.05 level
confirms the validity of the specification chosen
12. All estimated coefficients are statistically
significant and on the whole similar to those of equation (2). Thus the income elasticity at
sample means is 0.35 and that of the ageing population 0.12. Therefore, both equations (2)
and (3) of Table 3 confirm that health care is not a luxury good, a result which is consistent
with both stylised facts and economic theory
13.
Equation (3) confirms that, in the framework of the interregional inequalities detected
by the area clusters, certain regions with expenditures below average reduced it further (e.g.,
Lombardia and Sicilia), while others increased it towards the average (e.g., Campania) or
above the national average (e.g., Abruzzo and Sardenia).  But overall, the regions which were
below the average in 1980 continue to remain below the average in 1995. Consequently, the
reforms have not removed the interregional inequalities of health care expenditure.13
4. Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this study was to analyse the determinants of regional health care expenditure in
Italy and provide answers to two pressing questions: (1) whether in Italy there is regionalism
in health care expenditure; (2) whether the reforms recently introduced in Italy’s NHS have
moved the health care towards interregional equality. Our empirical results show that the most
important determinant of the volume of regional health care expenditure is regional income.
Among the factors of lesser importance are: (i) the ageing population; and (ii) structural
characteristics, relating to economies of scale and productivity. Of these factors, per capita
income and the ageing population are not under the direct control of policy makers.
Economies of scale and productivity, which are associated with supply-side variables, are
potentially controllable but their influence in the determination of the growth of expenditures
is weak and may be subject to political considerations and constraints.
Our analysis of health care expenditure has found conspicuous and statistically
significant differences among the regions of Italy. These geographical components in the
determination of health care expenditure patterns most probably reflect the existence of latent
variables associated with regionally specific socio-historical, institutional and political factors
and trends, local government power echelons and vested interests, and regional economic
disparities: see DIRINDIN, 1996. The latter means disparities in per capita income which is
the main determinant of health care expenditure. Therefore, interregional equality in the
provision of health care would require the allocation of the central government’s contribution
to regional health care budgets according to national equalisation criteria. But this is not what
is happening in Italy. Moreover, following their own targets and, presumably, their electors’
wishes, the regional and local authorities have the ability to vary the allocation of their14
budgets.
 
As a result, the regional health care expenditure and provision of health care are unequal.
Therefore, health care inequality is one of the factors contributing to Italy’s regional economic
problem.  High spending regions are not only those which have high per capita income and
therefore can afford it, but also those which for mostly political reasons rank health care
expenditure among the top priorities of government. HOFFMEYER and McCARTHY, 1995,
p.512, have identified this problem succinctly: “In common of much of Italy’s public sector,
constitutionally mandated decentralisation of (expenditure not revenue-raising) powers
combines with a lack of decisive national political leadership to create weak vertical lines of
control” … “The importance of patronage in Italian politics has led to power-holders doing
their best to incorporate in legislation as many opportunities as possible for the exercise of
discretionary administrative decisions.  Political interference in the USL [Local health Units]
is also a problem… unsurprisingly given that health is the largest expenditure item in the
regional governments’ budgets.”
Our results show that, up to 1995, the reform process managed to contain the growth
of health care expenditure at the national level while preserving the regional inequalities. The
regions which habitually spent on health more than the national average continued to do so
after the reforms, whilst many of the regions which spend the least on health care managed to
contain the growth of health care expenditure. Therefore, the existing inequalities continued
and in some cases worsened.15
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Table 1 - The evolution of regional public per capita health care  expenditure
                                           in Italy (000 ITL, 1990 prices)
Regions 1980 1995 % change
    1980-91       1992-95
North
1.  Valle D'Aosta 686.6 886.7 35.89 -6.71
2.  Piemonte 615.7 785.7 28.59 -1.45
3.  Lombardia 636.4 748.7 22.37 -2.89
4.  Trentino Alto Adige 659.2 925.0 35.30 2.40
5.  Veneto 781.4 974.1 17.64 2.90
6.  Friuli Venezia Giulia 816.1 1035.4 24.02 2.68
7.  Liguria 891.9 1075.8 23.09 -2.34
8.  Emilia Romagna 790.5 1137.5 35.60 2.79
Centre
9.  Toscana 697.9 915.8 31.44 1.25
10. Umbria 775.7 1014.9 21.40 6.51
11. Marche 822.5 1059.4 27.34 -0.36
12. Lazio 625.8 786.8 19.05 6.32
South
13. Abruzzo 695.3 855.9 10.72 9.03
14. Molise 671.5 895.5 19.93 8.23
15. Campania 622.5 749.0 2.82 12.37
16. Puglia 530.8 522.4 17.23 -12.76
17. Basilicata 443.5 737.5 50.42 6.53
18. Calabria 465.7 740.3 44.23 6.00
19. Sicilia 532.9 704.6 29.53 1.24
20. Sardegna 667.1 912.1 20.18 12.90
ITALY   Mean 655.4 826.0 22.62 1.92
               standard deviation 119.9 157.1 11.07 4.01
Data source: Istat (1998)19
                          Table 2 - Clusters of Regions and Associated Dummies
Categories No. of clusters Regions Dummy
1. Average 1 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20 AREA0
2. Less than average
     2.1 lower
     2.2 medium








3. More than average
     3.1 lower
     3.2 medium








Note: AREA0 comprises the regions under the constant term. The names of the regions are         


















                                 Figure 1: AREA clusters of the 20 Italian Regions
Legent: Vertical axis=GDP per head; Horizontal axis= Health care expenditure per head; 
                                                               Area value= Aged.21
Table 3: Estimation of Health Care Expenditure Functions
Explanatory Variables Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3
Coefficient        (t-ratio) Coefficient        (t-ratio) Coefficient        (t-ratio)
interecept          a    0.405               (9.739)    0.419              (9.753)    0.438            (10.654)
Income              Y    0.011               (7.281)    0.013              (7.639)    0.014             (8.602)
Ageing               A    1.176               (5.204)    0.863              (3.494)      0.635             (2.816)
Hospital Beds   HB  - 0.023               (3.615)  - 0.021              (3.494)  - 0.021             (3.623)
Hospital Staff    HS    0.008               (3.069)    0.012              (4.870)    0.012             (4.699)
         AREA        1  - 0.132             (6.733)  - 0.130            (6.716)
                            2  - 0.161             (4.950)  - 0.136            (7.183)
                            3    0.055             (2.396)    0.052            (2.215)
                            4    0.100             (4.840)    0.109            (5.111)
                            5    0.078             (2.800)    0.084            (2.898)
                            6  - 0.061             (2.198)  - 0.064           (3.812)
Regional Dummy RD 3  - 0.051           (3.683)
                                 13    0.024           (1.969)
                                 15    0.037           (1.942)
                                 16  - 0.097           (3.691)
                                 20    0.062           (3.762)
R
2 observed/predicted         0.900        0.973         0.984
￿ standard deviation         0.697        0.568         1.024
SSE       219.54      99.682       318.7822
1.  This is also holds for countries with sizeable private provision of health care since even there the
public expenditure on health is high, more than 75 per cent of the total in the OECD countries:
SCHIEBER et al., 1994.
  
2. The few previous studies that dealt with  the geographic disaggregation of health care expenditure
have invariably highlighted the observed interregional differences in spending which they attempted
to explain. Thus DI MATTEO and DI MATTEO, 1998; have attributed the differences in health
spending patterns across Canadian Provinces to the administrative and financial independence they
enjoy which enables them to meet directly the demand of their own citizens.  In contrast, a similar
study across prefectures in Japan: TOKITA et al., 1997; has attributed the significant interregional
variation in health spending to the different age structure of populations and to differences in
adopting costly modern technology which in many instances is an extravagance and waste of
resources with no positive effect on life expectancy. 
3. The geographical equality of national  health provision could also be achieved by the free
migration of people from one region to another, including patients moving  in search of specialised
treatment, subject of course to regional health service approval.
4. An additional problem arises from the limited size of the times series sample which restricts the
choice of explanatory variables for ‘degrees of freedom’ considerations. 
5. The denominator ‘hospitals’ is taken as a reference point for comparisons and it does not imply
that, e.g., the personnel is only that employed by hospitals. It is all NHF staff. As an alternative for
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the last two variables, we also tested the variables ‘beds per population’ and ‘personnel per
population’ and found comparable results. We also disaggregated the ‘personnel per population’
variable to doctors and other staff  but found inconsistent results due to multicollinearities. Given
the observed growth in private health care expenditure, we also tested the per capita private
expenditure as an explanatory variable but the estimated coefficient was consistently statistically
nonsignificant, indicating that in deciding the health care budget the Public Health Authorities do
not regard the private expenditure as a substitute nor as a complement of the public health care
expenditure.  
6.  Thus reducing the possibility of bias from fluctuations in the time-series data arising from regional
transitory short-term factors and from the subjective choice of the year of cross section regressions.
The panel data for the estimation come from the Italian National Institute of Statistics ( ISTAT) and
consists of 16 year time-series observations, 1980-1995, for the 20 Italian regions. Data on public
health care expenditure and GDP come from  Regional Accounts, while data on population size and
age structure come from the Annual Yearbook of Statistics. Health care data (number of
public/private beds, personnel  etc.) come from the Annual Yearbook of  Health Care Statistics.
7. Other methods of estimation are based on different assumptions about the structure of the cross
section units and the disturbance terms.  Thus we also tested whether the pooled model could be
assumed to be cross-sectionally correlated and time-wise autoregressive: KMENTA, 1986; but
obtained inconclusive results. In principle,  time series must also be tested for cointegration.
However, in our sample the limited number of observations (n=16) precludes any valid testing of
this kind.  Nevertheless, McCOSKEY and SELDEN, 1998; who have studied this problem for the
OECD countries, have stated that with regard to cointegration there may be no problem: “researchers
studying national health care expenditures need not be as concerned as previously thought about the24
presence of unit roots in the data.” (p. 375). For a discussion on stationarity and cointegration in
health care spending and the emerging contradictory results see BLOMQVIST and CARTER, 1997,
who conclude: “These contradictory results  may well be the result of size distortions from applying
these asymptotically based tests to such small samples” (p. 225). Therefore, although the question
of stationarity of the data is an important problem, in general it cannot be answered satisfactorily
with the currently available size of samples of health care statistics. 
8.  The form of the function is consistent with the micro-economic theory, since to exclude
distributional effects from the analysis, for which, among other things, one must have that all Engel
curves are linear for consumers.
9.  For the estimation, the data are transformed and, therefore, the usual goodness of fit statistics are
inappropriate.  We have used instead the R-square between observed and predicted values of the
dependent variable.
 
10. DI MATTEO and DI MATTEO, 1998; have specified 10dummies representing the Canadian
Provinces  but have not considered the possibility of regional clusters. Judging from the confidence
intervals of the estimated coefficients and corresponding standard errors, their dummies seem to
cluster  into three groups. A side effect of the clustering of the regional dummies is that the number
of independent variables is reduced, with savings in the degrees of freedom. 
  
11. Such as KLEIMAN, 1974; LEU, 1986; and BLOMQVIST and CARTER, 1997. For the opposite
views see DENTON and SPENCER, 1975; and  CUTLER and MEARA, 1997.  The OECD, 1997
reports that in a sample of eleven countries, the health spending of the 65-74 age group is on average
2.5 times the spending of the 0-64 age group; for the 75+ age group, the ratio is almost 5.0. For a25
discussion on the role of ageing population in explaining the evolution of expenditure in Italy see
DIRINDIN,  1996; and MAPELLI, 1994.
12. Similar results are obtained when testing the significance of the entire set of dummy variables,
AREA and RD, with F=39.97 vs. F(19,287)=1.64. 
13. We know that if the Engel curve has a linear functional form, the income elasticity will be one
only if it passes through the origin. If the coefficient for income is positive and  the intercept term
is either positive, as it is in our case, or negative, the elasticity will be respectively, lower or greater
than one. Therefore, the intercept term is crucial in determining the size of the elasticity and, when
there is a misspecification problem, it may contain the unpredictable effects of omitted variables. As
reported above, we tested for model for functional form misspecification and found that a linear
model was accepted. 